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Bluefin Tuna Fishery Policy in Malta: The plight of artisanal fishermen caught in the 1 
capitalist net 2 
3 
Abstract 4 
The bluefin tuna fishery has undergone a major shift in Malta, moving from an open access 5 
artisanal nature to a privatised and industrialized activity dominated by the purse seining fleet 6 
and the BFT ranching industry. The shift has been exacerbated by the national implementation 7 
of an individual transferable quota system, which has enabled the concertation of quotas into 8 
fewer hands.  The main objective of this article is to understand how privatisation has evolved 9 
within the sector and the way the Maltese artisanal fishermen are experiencing the shift. This 10 
study takes an exploratory mixed-method approach to quantitatively and qualitatively 11 
understand how policy underpinnings interplay with the sustainability dimension of the small-12 
scale fishing sector. Results show that the transition of the bluefin tuna fishery from artisanal 13 
to industrial has generated a legitimacy crisis over fishing rights, decreased profitability 14 
amongst most of the artisanal fleet, and led to a series of socio-ecological impacts on the 15 
artisanal fisheries system at large. It is concluded that the neo-liberal trajectories of 16 
industrialization have directly undermined the continued sustainability of artisanal fishing 17 
communities. 18 
19 
1. Introduction and Background20 
Artisanal fishing communities represent a long-standing tradition of fishermen engaged in low-21 
capital enterprises that have persisted through various cycles of economic and social change 22 
through the recent decades[1]. However, artisanal sectors are generally known to exhibit high 23 
vulnerability from unpredictable ecological, social, political and economic fluctuations due to 24 
their low-capital base [2].  Furthermore when changes or disturbances arise from exogenous 25 
forces, such as policy frameworks that are developed and imposed upon traditional  systems of 26 
governance and knowledge, this can quickly erode the stability and resilience of small-scale 27 
fishing communities , especially if the changes are not synchronized to the realities of the 28 
context in which they are implemented [3]. The dismantling of small-scale fishing communities 29 
has been registered in various countries worldwide e.g. North America [3], Iceland [4], 30 
Australia[5] and Canada [6], and despite their geographical differences, these cases appear to 31 
share a similar economic and political backdrop of neo-liberalism that catalysed the 32 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶GHPLVH 33 




Generally, these studies show how the push towards the neo-liberal privatisation of fisheries 34 
resources has triggered the enclosure of the commons with the consequence that small-scale 35 
fishing operations become outcompeted by large-scale fishing industries. Through 36 
privatisation, the latter become  empowered to over-accumulate resources and profits, and 37 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\GLVSRVVHVVLQGLJHQRXVULJKWV¶KROGHUVIURPWKHLUOLYHOLKRRGV [7]. This process 38 
oIµaccumulation by dispoVVHVVLRQ¶, as conceptualized by Harvey, is a transition underpinned 39 
by the capitalistic ideology and buttressed by State and/or equivalent authoritative power which  40 
SOD\DVLJQLILFDQWUROHµLQERWKEDFNLQJDQGSURPRWLQJ¶WKHWUDMHFWRU\RIresource aggregation 41 
through the crafting of neo-liberal policies [7]. By drawing on the theoretical underpinnings of 42 
neoliberalism in fisheries management, this article provides an in-depth understanding of how 43 
VKLIWV LQ WKHILVKHULHV¶policy fundamentals in Malta have triggered a major change that has 44 
made it more difficult for the Maltese artisanal fishing sector to survive. The special focus of 45 
this research falls on the management of the BFT fishery, one of the most lucrative fishing 46 
activities but also the most regulated in the Mediterranean region. 47 
 48 
 The BFT fishery in Malta has existed since the 1700s [8] and official landing records of catches 49 
have been compiled since the 1920s [9]. Initially BFT was fished by an artisanal trap system 50 
(tunnara) and successively, from the 1960s, by artisanal-long-lines which are hook-and-line 51 
methods baited with mackerel suited to target pelagic species. Some artisanal fishers use 52 
specific long-line gear to target BFT, and others harvest tuna  as by-catch from  swordfish long-53 
lines [10]. Overall, their individual catches differed on the basis of skill and effort applied to 54 
the fishery. The cumulative Maltese artisanal BFT catch fluctuated across the decades but there 55 
was a drastic increase in the 1990s (Figure 1) as a response to new export opportunities in 56 
lucrative foreign markets, such as Japan, that enticed greater participation by artisanal 57 
fishermen [9]. 58 
 59 
As of 2001, fishermen started experiencing decreasing catches, possibly due to the 60 
overexploitation  of the species  across the Mediterranean waters [11]. Due to its scarcity, the 61 
competition for the species became intense, and many Maltese fishermen became involved in 62 
µWXQDZDUV¶ with foreign companies that used purse seine industrial methods, which not only 63 
caught large numbers of fish, but also allegedly disturbed the artisanal long-line activities [12]. 64 
Following this prolonged period of conflict the national Minister for Fisheries in 2001 had 65 
publicly XUJHGWKH0DOWHVHILVKHUPHQWR³equip themselves like their [foreign] competitors´66 
[13]. Later, around 2005, the government issued permits for the start-up of the purse seine fleet 67 




which is an industrial type of fishing that uses large nets to catch large numbers of BFT species. 68 
This gear, which was first introduced with the emerging expansion of the tuna ranching sector, 69 
is considered the most suitable technology for capturing, corralling, and growing out large 70 
stocks of wild tuna [11].  71 
 72 
 73 
     (Figure 1 here) 74 
   75 
 76 
This industry, which supplies tuna to the global sushi and sashimi markets has been growing 77 
since it began in 2001 and currently there is a total fattening capacity of 12,300 tonnes [14], 78 
gHQHUDWLQJDERXW¼00 million in sales over the past 6 years [15].  The Maltese tuna ranching 79 
ranks second after Italy in terms of EU tuna production capacity [16], and as a profitable 80 
business across the Mediterranean, the expansion of tuna ranching has been supported by 81 
several governments across the basin [17,18]. However, this growth, which led to a higher 82 
fishing effort on wild tuna, has been a main driver that led to an alarming rate of BFT 83 
overfishing over the past decades [19]. The co-existence of industrial and artisanal fleets in the 84 
Mediterranean had contributed to the decline of the bluefin tuna species [20], and international 85 
efforts have been ongoing to reverse this situation in the Mediterranean and elsewhere [21].    86 
                                   
 87 
A global plan to improve the health of the stock by 2022 was introduced in 2007 by the 88 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) [22]. As part of this 89 
plan, a system of total allowable catches (TACs) across countries was enacted to regulate the 90 
fishing activity of Atlantic and Mediterranean BFT. TACs allocations have been decreasing 91 
every year until 2013 in an attempt to control catches, reduce overfishing, and eventually limit 92 
capacity. These regional efforts have improved the recovery rate of the BFT, and without 93 
undermining the stability of the stocks, it was agreed at the ICCAT meeting in 2014 that TACs 94 
were to be increased by 20% each year, until the new stock assessment in 2016 [23].  95 
 96 
Malta as an EU Member State is signatory to the BFT conservation efforts and subject to the  97 
policies including quota restrictions and increments that are annually recommended at the 98 
ICCAT level and successively transposed as EU Council Regulation(s) that bind EU member 99 
states. As part of the agreement, Malta is requested to annually devise a national management 100 




plan to align the fishing capacity to the BFT fishing opportunities agreed and assigned during 101 
the European Council meetings. This obligation and the local measures that have accompanied 102 
it, have brought a drastic change in the Maltese fishing management portfolio of the BFT 103 
fishery. For example, the Maltese Government with the consent of the fLVKHUPHQ¶V co-104 
operatives  agreed to: a) reduce the BFT fleet capacity by 25%; b) introduce a national system 105 
of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) based on historical records; and c) create the BFT 106 
recreational segment as a new category of fishing activity that is allocated approximately 1-2% 107 
of the national TAC. 108 
 109 
These regulatory changes, which are embedded in neoliberal ideology, have synergistically 110 
reshaped the fundamental organisation of both the BFT fishery and the artisanal sector as a 111 
whole.   The GovernmHQW¶Vmanagement plan frames these changes DVWKHµbackbone of the 112 
0DOWHVH)LVKHULHVFRQVHUYDWLRQDFWLRQV¶which are aimed to µfacilitate the recovery of BFT 113 
stocks to create sustainable economic conditions for the continued operation of the BFT fishing 114 
fleet¶[24]. This article draws on this statement as the point of departure for a critical assessment 115 
of the impacts of the policy measures enacted under the BFT management plan, with a special 116 
focus on the traditional artisanal fishing community.  117 
 118 
The impacts that the Maltese artisanal fleet has experienced through the changes in the BFT 119 
fishery have not been studied to date. While much work has been done on the politics of the 120 
bluefin tuna ranching sector in Malta and the Mediterranean e.g. [17,25,26], the position of the 121 
artisanal fishermen of Malta within the fast moving policy infrastructure for bluefin tuna in the 122 
EU remains somewhat obscure.  Bluefin tuna has always been considered as one of the main 123 
profitable fisheries for the Maltese fishermen [27], hence understanding the impact of the 124 
changes brought onto the fishing communities by the BFT management framework is 125 
extremely important  to a broader assessment of the sustainability of this sector as a whole.  In 126 
this regard, the research aims to answer these following questions:  127 
1. Understand how the implementation of policy and market drivers have altered the 128 
dynamic of the artisanal fishery 129 
2. How these  changes  have been experienced by the artisanal  fishermen themselves  130 
 131 
2. Methods 132 




This section presents a methodological approach that allows us to explain a complex story 133 
using a synchronised interpretation of policy changes, fisheries data and qualitative interview-134 
based data with fishermen themselves. Important themes or issues are identified and described 135 
before giving way to a general discussion and conclusions. This case study is based on 136 
extensive fieldwork carried out between May 2014 and August 2015 in two main fishing 137 
villages, namely Marsaxlokk and Mgarr (Gozo). These villages host two long-established 138 
Maltese fishing communities that in many ways are representative of the social, economic and 139 
cultural fabric of the Maltese artisanal fishing sector [27], and thus provide the appropriate 140 
context for the exploration of the research questions. 141 
 142 
The exploratory nature of the study calls for data collection methods that enable an in-depth 143 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH DUWLVDQDO ILVKHUPHQ¶V SHUVSHFWLYHV DQG H[SHULHQFHV. The main data 144 
collection system used for this research involved participant observation in the main fishing 145 
villages. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with fishermen, their family members, 146 
and other individuals within the community. The use of gatekeepers was essential to access 147 
different networks of fishermen through purposeful snowballing. As has been reported in 148 
similar research [e.g. 21]µKDSSHQVWDQFHHQFRXQWHUV¶LQLQIRUPDOVHWWLQJValso provided very 149 
rich and wide-ranging data from various informants.  Ethical considerations, in line with the 150 
guidelines of the American Anthropological Association (AAA), were taken into account 151 
throughout the data collection process.  152 
 153 
The primary data was complemented with other sources including online forums, media 154 
articles, and formal national statements VXFK DV %)7 PDQDJHPHQW SODQV 0LQLVWU\¶V SXEOLF155 
statements and other statistical information. The open-ended comparative techniques used to 156 
triangulate the data assured that the findings were consistent, valid and reliable. After each 157 
successive collection, the data sets were qualitatively analysed and coded to elicit the major 158 
issues that were then categorized into relevant themes, upon which the narrative was ultimately 159 
based. Direct excerpts gauged through interviews and participatory observations are 160 
incorporated within the narrative to illustrate major factors that have been provoked by the 161 
fishermen themselves.  162 
 163 
3) Results 164 
3.1) BFT Conservation through Privatisation: The legitimization of the purse seiner 165 




In this section, the article presents the role of government policy in establishing and supporting 166 
the industrialization of the bluefin tuna sector by empowering the operations of the PS fleet at 167 
the expense of the artisanal fleet. The beginning of the industrialization process can be traced 168 
to the licensing of the first purse seine in 2005 which overhauled long-established national 169 
legislation (L.N. 205/34) that had restricted the licensing of such vessels on the basis of 170 
sustainability and to prevent monopolization of fishing effort. Since then its operations have 171 
been legitimized through a purse-seine-pilot-study in 2007, and subsequently accelerated 172 
through the major leasing framework that followed the introduction of the Individual 173 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs) in 2009. Since the purse seine did not have a historical record of 174 
catch due to its relatively late entry to the BFT fleet, it was not assigned a specific ITQ, hence, 175 
its participation could only be institutionally legitimized through the transferability of ITQs 176 
from artisanal fishermen (with catch records) to purse seine operators.  177 
 178 
The ITQ scheme, enacted in 2009, recognized and authorized only around 20% of the full-time 179 
fleet (82 vessels) and 0.6% of the part-WLPHIOHHWYHVVHOVDV%)7ULJKWV¶KROGHUV (see [29]). 180 
The rest of the vessel owners were thus excluded from quota on the basis that they did not have 181 
official records of BFT catches declared at the central fish market. Although some of these 182 
fishermen used other lawful markets to sell their tuna, WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GDWD FROOHFWLRQ183 
exercise to establish the ITQs allocation system did not fully account for these catches1. 184 
According to one ILVKHUPDQ³before we used to sell a lot of tuna through hands [fisherman-to-185 
consumer] and did QRW WDNH LW WR WKH ILVK PDUNHW´, while another fisherman stated that the 186 
problem of non-BFT-declaration was also OLQNHGWRWD[HYDVLRQ³and so when it came to the 187 
DFWXDOILJXUHVWKHLUTXRWDVZDVUHODWLYHO\ORZ´ As illustrated in Figure 2, the allocation system 188 
of the BFT categorized the fleet into large-ITQ-holders, medium-ITQ holders, small-ITQ-189 
holders and non-quota holders. In 2010 over 50% of quota was held by 16% of fishermen and 190 
over the past 5 years, the ownership of ITQs ownership has become even more concentrated 191 
(Figure 2). 192 
 193 
Most of this concentration reflects the investment made by the purse seine industry which has 194 
been purchasing ITQs of the smaller and least wealthy ITQ holders. These companies now 195 
possess the quota and the fishing permits of very many artisanal fishermen, and since 2014 196 
have enjoyed the annual TAC increments that have been assigned on each artisanal permit by 197 
                                                 
1
 7KLVFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\PHDQWKDWWKHEDVHOLQHXVHGWRHVWDEOLVK0DOWD¶V7$&KDVQRWEHHQFDOFXODWHGDFFXUDWHO\ 




the government. The accumulation of fishing rights and windfall gains of TAC increments is 198 
favouring those few enterprises that own multiple permits, whereas fishermen with no permits 199 
or with small/medium quotas are unable to acquire quota  since the prices of fishing permits 200 
and quota are escalating to unaffordable ranges.  201 
 202 
 203 





This approach of accumulation is enhanced by other pro-industrial policies that have reduced 209 
the number of active artisanal vessels. These include the permanent de-commissioning of 18 210 
artisanal vessels from the BFT fleet register that were demolished under the European Fisheries 211 
Fund scheme, and the fishing authorization scheme that has, in the past 5 years, prioritized 212 
artisanal long-liners with large quotas and the purse seining fleet to operate as active fishing 213 
vessels. In its management plan for BFT fishing capacity over the period 2010-2013 the 214 
government reported that ³0DOWDZLOOQRWDOORZWKRVHYHVVHOVWKDWKDYHDTXRWDOHVVWKDQNJ215 
to actively fish for BFT- however they may transfer their quota to another vessel which already 216 
KDVTXRWD´[30,31].This scheme, which is embedded in the neo-liberal ideology of allocating 217 
TAC in the most efficient manner, has derailed the ability of small-quota holders to actively 218 
engage in the fishery and catch their quotas.   219 
 220 
Since 2010, the average number of artisanal vessels that were authorized to operate was less 221 
than half of the permit-KROGHUV Q§ Unlike the active counterpart who are authorized to 222 
catch their quotas and sell them to through the lucrative export market, the small-ITQ holders  223 
have been compelled to lease out their fishing rights to WKH ODUJHU PRUH µHIILFLHQW¶224 
predominantly purse seine, lessees. This policy left small ITQ holders considerably worse off. 225 
A fisherman explained that between 2010 and 2014, the prices attached to the leased-ITQs i.e. 226 
¼WR¼ were less than the reported export price of between ¼and ¼DQGfor this reason 227 
many small-ITQ holders would have preferred to catch rather than lease their ITQs.  228 
 229 
$OWKRXJKWKHVHµQRQ-RSHUDWLRQDO¶ tuna fishermen could have caught their shares as by-catch 230 
with other fisheries, this option is less financially rewarding as by-caught tuna is not destined 231 
for the more lucrative export market. Also there are conditions on declaring tuna as by-catch 232 




which essentially rule out this option for many fishermen as explained by one fisherman, 233 
³quota can only be caught as by-catch, and to declare a tuna, you ought to catch 20 heads of 234 
swordfish.  Now, for a fisherman to catch 20 heads of swordfish he has to be very lucky, so the 235 
policy is there to dishearten the fishermen from catching his small quota as by-catch and 236 
instead  OHDVHLWWRWKHILVKIDUP´  237 
 238 
3.2) Tuna ranching is transforming the fishing economy of Malta: Accumulation by 239 
dispossession 240 
The tuna ranching industry is owned by only 5 companies [32], 2 of which are foreign investors.  241 
Between 2009 and 2013 one of the companies, as reported in the 0DOWD¶V$TXDFXOWXUH6WUDWHJ\242 
[32], was registered in the name of an ex-representative of a fishery co-operative. This 243 
company, which also owned a purse seine license, was the first to engage in the purse seining 244 
of the national TAC through the pilot study and successively started leasing ITQs from the 245 
fishermen through the leasing framework. This in turn initiated the process of µaccumulation 246 
by dispossession¶ of the artisanal sector quota, and now most of the national TAC is the 247 
property of the tuna ranching industry (Figure 1). 248 
 249 
The fattening of the national TAC was only possible through the increase in ITQ ownership 250 
through the permanent purchase of artisanal permits, and by policy developments surrounding 251 
the fishing capacity clauses of the national management plan that forces small-quota owners 252 
into becoming leasers. Also, by offering the opportunity to some of the larger ITQ holders (who 253 
own larger iron vessels) to earn income from  towing tuna cages equivalent to approximately  254 
¼ GDLO\ IRU   PRQWKV D \HDU WXQD UDQFKHUV ZHUH DEOH WR VHFXUH WKH OHDVH RI WKHVH255 
ILVKHUPHQ¶V,74Vas well. This shows that the tuna ranching sector has become the real owner 256 
of the national BFT and as illustrated in Figure 3, its controls are predominant in most of the 257 
transactions of the BFT fishery. 258 
 259 
 260 




Along with being the main owner and lessee of the national TAC, the tuna ranching sector also 265 
controls access to the lucrative foreign BFT markets. These connections are allowing the tuna 266 




ranchers to exploit prices to their advantage with for example, active long-liners who must 267 
export their BFT via the tuna ranchers.  For this reason, the ranching industry has a monopoly 268 
over the price of both the lease and the export market, and it is therefore in a powerful position 269 
to maximise profits and/or act strategically at the expense of the artisanal fishing fleet. For 270 
example, by reducing the difference between the leased-ITQ price (¼WR¼LQ) and the 271 
export price of ITQ caught tuna (at around ¼WR¼ in 2015), the tuna ranchers have been able 272 
to attract the majority of independent Maltese ITQ holders to lease their ITQ directly to them. 273 
Consequently the number of active long-liners fishing their ITQs decreased by 71% between 274 
2014 and 2015.  275 
 276 
Maltese long-liners have also been discouraged from retaining their rights to fish for tuna ITQ 277 
because of what they perceive as µLQWLPLGDWLQJ¶ control procedures that are enforced by the 278 
government as part of the EU recovery plan.  For example, they get regular at-sea-inspections 279 
and are requested to fill-in a number of documentation, which they perceive as a heavy 280 
bureaucratic burden on their fishing operations, which has made them anxious and under 281 
pressure.  After narrating a bitter experience that he encountered with enforcement procedures 282 
at sea, an active long-liner said ³«these days I am always afraid ± and my fear only ends when 283 
I get back home ± not when I tie up the boat but when I am in my house´ 284 
 285 
While the surveillance on the active long-liners is implemented as an explicit measure to ensure 286 
that the quota limits are observed, it is safe to assume that these procedures are an µimplicit¶ 287 
way of disheartening them from actively engaging in the fishery, and to encourage them to 288 
instead lease their ITQs to tuna ranching operators. Taken together all these measures have 289 
synergistically caused a major reduction in the number of operational fishermen amongst the 290 
artisanal fleet and the recruitment of locals who were, prior to privatisation, employed as extra 291 
deckhands for the BFT season between April and July. As a result of the neo-liberal processes 292 
that has given a new shape to the BFT fishery and restricted most of the fleet from fishing this 293 
resource, one can notice a spill-over of the artisanal sector onto other fishing systems which 294 
are of an open access nature.  295 
 296 
3.3) Artisanal Livelihood Struggles: Spill-over effects onto other fishing systems  297 
The reforms of the bluefin tuna fishery and the concomitant marginalization of non-permit 298 
holders, and the domination  of the tuna ranching industry, also has major repercussions  for 299 
other fisheries systems which lack the same  monitoring and management of the bluefin tuna 300 




system.  As fishermen explained, fishing activity during what was before the BFT season, has 301 
now transferred to other fisheries, mainly trammel netting and gill netting, targeting demersal 302 
and small pelagic species respectively. For example, official statistics show that between 2007 303 
and 2012 the days at sea (fishing effort) on trammel nets has increased by 4,500% while gillnets 304 
have increased by  870% (Figure 4). Fishermen have described this as a spill-over directly 305 
related to decreased profitability endured by non-permit BFT holders who had to diversify into 306 
other fishing systems, and by fishermen who have chosen to lease out their ITQs rather than 307 
fish them.  308 
 309 
     (Figure 4 here) 310 
 311 
 312 
For the most deprived, this displacement is a way of compensating for the loss of tuna fishing 313 
and other livelihood pressures, but for a smaller number of fishers with large ITQs, leasing has 314 
been lucrative, and allowed them to gain income from leasing their quota, and maximise their 315 
profits by deploying their vessels in the trammel net and gill net fisheries. Whereas non-permit 316 
holders and small-ITQ holders deploy a maximum of 12-15 trammel nets per day, the large 317 
ITQ holders who have become economically empowered through ITQ-acquisition are 318 
engaging in very intensive fishing, deploying between 50-70 nets per day by employing extra 319 
hands who are often immigrant labourers.  As explained by a fisherman, ³the bigger boats [are] 320 
carrying 50 to 70 pieces of nets and working round the clock, thanks to imported cheap 321 
ODERXU´(Fisherman in Malta Today newspaper [33]).  322 
 323 
These open access fish populations, which are also fished by other fleet segments including 324 
industrial trawling and recreational fishing, may now be in a state of overexploitation. A 325 
fisherman, who has EHHQH[SHULHQFLQJGHFUHDVHG\LHOGVVWDWHGWKDW³«before 2010, we used 326 
to catch 20, 30 kilos of fish in one trip. This year (2015), we went three times with the trammel 327 
nets and we caught around 6-NLORVLQDOOWKHWKUHHWULSV,WLVQRWZRUWKLW´Hence those who 328 
have already experienced falling incomes due to the BFT industrialization process are now also 329 
having to confront the results of intensified fishing on the  stocks remaining open to them. As 330 
one fisherman KLJKOLJKWHG³the past was more viable in terms of catches and now the expenses 331 
KDYH LQFUHDVHGVR WKH IXWXUH LVQ¶WZHOFRPLQJ´ These fishermen perceive of their future as 332 
bleak and some have resorted to the recreational bluefin tuna fishing segment to make ends 333 
meet.  334 




3.4) The Rise of the Recreational Bluefin Tuna Sector 335 
Recreational bluefin tuna fishing was introduced in 2011 and has been implemented in line 336 
with the EU regulations2 after intensive pressure by the recreational lobby (Interview with 337 
Malta Fish Forum).  The recreational fishery is open to those who own a recreational vessel 338 
and authorises the catch of BFT that is annually assigned from the national TAC. A seasonal 339 
permit is issued for each vessel. Participants are requested to present it during patrols and 340 
FDWFKHV¶ UHJLVWUDWLRQV 6LQFH WKH ILVKHU\ LV D UHFUHDWLRQDO RQH WKH FDWFKHV FDQQRW EH341 
commercialised [34], however, they can be given to charity.  Artisanal fishermen who have 342 
been excluded or marginalized from the commercial segment of the bluefin tuna fishery 343 
perceive themselves as the ones in charity and have opted to benefit from this scheme.  344 
 345 
For many fishermen disadvantaged by the policy shifts and pro-efficiency drift of the Maltese 346 
government to favour tuna ranching, their only choice has been to register as a recreational 347 
fishermen and engage in BFT fishing activities permitted under this category.  The ability to 348 
benefit from a recreational permit and informally sell recreational TAC BFT at the meagre 349 
SUL]HRI¼- ¼NLORZDVDVWUDWHJ\WKDWILVKHUPHQhave been forced to adopt. The fishermen, 350 
however are not benefitting much as commercial sales are not allowed and they are easily 351 
exploited by middle men who can take advantage of the system. As a fisherman explained 352 
³«WKHILVKHUPHQHQGXSZLWKWKHFKHDSHVWSULFHIRUWKLVWXQDZKHQDQGLIWKH\ILQGSRWHQWLDO353 
buyers. The middle man tells you that he has the same level of risk as you do and so he wants 354 
WKHFKHDSHVWSULFH:HVHOODWXQDRINLORVIRU¼DQGWKHQWKH\VHOOLWIRUDURXQG¼NLOR355 
± PDNLQJDURXQG¼´  356 
 357 
The risk fishermen undertake to engage in this activity is significant and they are becoming 358 
more vulnerable since they are now subject to enforcement which is accompanied by financial 359 
penalties and criminalization procedures. In the past years, a number of fishermen have been 360 
taken to court as they have exceeded the one-tuna-per-trip catch, and their case was presented 361 
DVDµFULPLQDOSUDFWLFH¶(e.g. [35,36]). This demonstrates that fishermen are not only becoming 362 
disempowered by a system that creates financial vulnerabilities, but are also running the risk 363 
of criminal punishment for relatively small misdemeanours.    364 
 365 
                                                 
2 (EC 302/2009 (Art. 12 & 13)). 




3.5) Divide and Conquer - The role of the FisherPHQ¶V&ooperatives in the demise of the 366 
Artisanal Sector   367 
The crisis that the majority of the artisanal fleet is undergoing has not resulted from a series of 368 
unintended miscalculations, but from decision-making that has enjoyed the support of 369 
ILVKHUPHQ¶Vrepresentatives back in 2010. The transition into privatisation and industrialization 370 
was only possible because it had the official approval of politically-connected representatives 371 
within the Fisheries Co-operative who allegedly used their legitimate power to benefit from 372 
the investment opportunities of tuna ranching. Many fishermen highlighted that they were 373 
unaware of the decisions that were being agreed on their behalf behind closed doors and 374 
perceive the institutional process to be high-handed and lacking transparency. A retired 375 
fisherman stated WKDW³«when the company which belonged to the co-operative representatives 376 
had been awarded the pilot project for the purse seiner in 2007, we [the fishermen] ZHUHQ¶W377 
informed, let alonH FRQVXOWHG´. Co-operative representatives also fully supported the 378 
establishment of the new BFT ranching facilities back in 2005, stating that ³«the proposed 379 
project would be of benefit to fishermen´, and that, ³LI DSSURYHG LW ZRXOG EH ³WKH EHVW380 
&KULVWPDVSUHVHQWIRUILVKHUPHQ´[37].  However, this research suggests this has not been the 381 
case and the share of economic benefits that have accrued through the industrialization of the 382 
national TAC have been very unequal and arguably not consistent with the operating principles 383 
of a µFR-RSHUDWLYH¶VWUXFWXUH Tuna ranching, which was presented by the Cooperatives as a new 384 
niche for Maltese fishermen, benefits only around 5% of the full-time artisanal fishing fleet. 385 
These include co-operative members who accrued profits through the ranch ownership and 386 
15% of the ITQ holders who have diversified into cage towage during the purse seine season.  387 
Although there are  opportunities to work as labourers at the tuna ranching installations for 388 
those fishermen excluded from the BFT fishery directly,  this has not been an attractive option 389 
for most as ³ORZ-paid jobs do not provide the same income and job satisfaction as much as the 390 
%)7ILVKLQJDFWLYLW\´ 391 
 392 
It seems clear that the new arrangements of the BFT fishery have created new power relations, 393 
with most of the artisanal fishermen becoming disempowered by a tokenistic co-operative 394 
system that has facilitated their demise in the name of economic efficiency. Most fishermen 395 
criticize the system as capitalistic, and argue that they (the authorities) are rude, since they 396 
insinuate that there needs to be protection of the fish stocks ± when the reality is that the tuna 397 
fishing has become commercialized, and [most] Maltese fishermen, due to their artisanal 398 
QDWXUHKDYHUHPDLQHGRXWRI WKH ORRS´Although fishermen seem to be conscious of their 399 




VLWXDWLRQWKH\SHUFHLYHWKHPVHOYHVDVWKHµVPDOOILVK¶ZKRDUHXQDEOHWRFhange their destiny. 400 
In a ILVKHUPDQ¶VZRUGV: ³,XQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHVPDOOILVKQHYHUDWHWKHELJILVKDQGWKXVZH401 
DUHQRWJRLQJWREHDEOHWRRYHUWXUQWKHVLWXDWLRQRIWKHSXUVHVHLQHU´ 402 
 403 
Attempts to reverse this trajectory have so far proved to be futile since fishermen are too 404 
fragmented and feel impotent to challenge the industry which determines their livelihood 405 
pathways.  As explained by a fisherman: ³«ZHWULHGWRUDLVHDwareness amongst the fishermen 406 
EXWWKRVHZLWKRXWTXRWDVGRQ¶WOLNHXVEHFDXVHZHKDYHTXRWDDQGWKH\GRQ¶W6RZHFRXOGGR407 
QRWKLQJWRJHWKHU«,HQGHGXSWU\LQJWRFKDOOHQJHWKHsituation with another 4 fishermen but 408 
with time I realized it is useless. In fact I realized that I have to shut my mouth because these 409 
large companies have become the commanding regime in Malta. I depend on them whether I 410 
OLNHLWRUQRWEHFDXVHWKH\H[SRUWP\ILVK´. 411 
 412 
The economic power of the tuna ranching industry and the concomitant individualistic pursuits 413 
of the co-operative representatives, which have been invisibly taking place within the ambit of 414 
the liberal market transactions, are suffocating the artisanal segment and deteriorating the 415 
SROLWLFDO FDSLWDO RI WKH )LVKHUPHQ¶V &o-operative as a united force. Fishermen, who now 416 
identify one another as D µODUJH-,74 µVPDOO-,74¶ RU µQRQ-,74¶ KROGHU DUH QR ORQJHU WKH417 
FRKHVLYHJURXSWKDWKDVVWRRGXSIRUWKH0DOWHVHILVKHUPHQ¶VULJKWV. The same fishermen that 418 
in 2001 battled against foreign companies who affected their fishing rights [12], are now (in 419 
2015), more prone to struggle amongst each other, for example on who ought to benefit from 420 
the TAC increment, rather than to regain their power within a system of capitalistic monopoly.   421 
 422 
Fishermen have basically succumbed to the powerful forces of industrialists who allegedly 423 
have the inside track to senior politicians3. Through these processes, artisanal fishermen have 424 
become sufficiently fragmented and disempowered to an extent that they are unable to engage 425 
in collective and political action to bring about the much yearned change to revert the decline 426 
of the artisanal sector. Although promises for a better future in the bluefin tuna fishery have 427 
been assured by the Labour party during the election campaign election a couple of years ago, 428 
the fishermen has publicly claimed in a local newspaper that the government µEURNH SUH-429 
HOHFWRUDOSURPLVH¶DQGµat the end of the line we DUHQREHWWHURII«´[38].  430 
                                                 
3
 Paul Watson, the Sea Shepherd spokesperson, has instigated that the tuna industry is bribing Maltese 
politicians. See more: http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/16289/tuna-industry-bribing-maltese-
politicians-says-sea-shepherd-founder-20120223#.VOyk3vnF9V0   




4) Discussion 431 
The implementation of ITQs has been used in many countries e.g. New Zealand [39]; Iceland 432 
[40]; and Spain [41], however their benefit as fisheries management tools is highly debated. 433 
They are praised by biologists for deterring the race to fish and by economists for improving 434 
the aggregate economic performance through profit generation [42], and simultaneously 435 
criticized by social scientists for perpetrating social inequity, injustice and deprivation [43,6].  436 
This research show how the majority of the artisanal sector in Malta is enduring symptoms of 437 
dispossession, fragmentation, disempowerment and marginalization which have resulted 438 
directly from the BFT policy trajectories. It seems that tKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V%)7management 439 
plan has been a signficant  driver of change which is perpetrating the vulnerability of the 440 
artisanal fishermen and simultaneously enabling the expansion of the tuna ranching sector 441 
through the industrialization of the fishery.   442 
 443 
Like other Mediterranean countries, the BFT fishery in Malta has moved from a localised 444 
artisanal livelihood into µD PDVVLYH JROG UXVK LQVSLUHG E\ JOREDO FDSLWDOLVP¶ [44] led by 445 
powerful ranching investors [20]. In such policy-supported transitions, the knowledge, skills 446 
and hard work of fishermen have been replaced with a limited set of entrepreneurial 447 
opportunities available only to  those with access to significant capital [43]. Without specific 448 
and local provisions specifically for the artisanal fleet, decline and ultimate extinction of unique 449 
socio-ecological systems are almost inevitable. In Spain the Government has established an 450 
alternative course for the artisanal fleet by implementing measures that ensure equitable ITQ 451 
distribution by accounting for historical activity and socio-economic dependency on the 452 
fishery, and restricting the concentration of rights by companies  [45]. In stark contrast the 453 
policy of Malta has enabled the unhindered shift toward a highly capitalist system based around 454 
and entirely dependent on the hegemony of the international tuna ranching industry.     455 
 456 
It can be argued that the development of the ITQ  framework  which has marginalized non-457 
record-keepers and triggered systemic socio-ecological problems, demonstrate that the main 458 
aim of ITQs was in essence to serve the agenda of the industrial elites rather than  to improve 459 
the BFT stocks for the long-term benefit or indeed survival  of the artisanal fleet. In other 460 
words, ITQs , as a privatisation mechanism, was e usHGDVDWRROWROHJLWLPL]HWKHµDFFXPXODWLRQ461 
E\GLVSRVVHVVLRQ¶[7] process that empowered the industrial fleet at the expense of the artisanal 462 
sector.  463 
 464 




 The embedded nature of the ITQ system within the paradigm of economic efficiency 465 
concomitant with the industrialised world, which enables the consolidation of property rights 466 
by the powerful few, seems to obscure the major predicaments that are related to social equity 467 
and sustainable livelihoods [46,47]. The fact that the BFT stock has recovered, but most of the 468 
Maltese artisanal fishermen are still experiencing an overall decreased profitability confirms 469 
that the political urge to cater for the sustainability of resources has only been to support the 470 
tuna ranching sector which brings µgood foreign currency to Malta¶ [48] and attain a BFT 471 
compliance certificate from the EU [see 42]. The resilience of the artisanal fishing communities 472 
does not classify in either of these priorities, and the needs of the sector remains only a concern 473 
highlighted in UKHWRULFDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSXEOLFGLVSOD\VVXFKDV0LQLVWHULDOVSHHFKHVFDOOLQJIRU474 
the protection and sustainability of small-scale fishermen [50].  475 
 476 
The pledge of the government to safeguard  the small-scale fisheries and coastal communities 477 
in the adoption of the new EU common fisheries policy [51] seems to have been contradicted 478 
by neoliberal policy mechanisms of ITQs that suffocate the upward mobility of the artisanal 479 
fleet. In reality, fishermen are not equipped to protect themselves against the policy shocks and 480 
market forces brought about by industrialization. Instead, they have become oppressed by a 481 
system that has dispossessed them and disempowered them by creating policy instruments that 482 
discriminate, fragment and disunite. The µGLYLGH-to-UXOH¶[52] strategy is inhibiting them from 483 
speaking with a common voice against the national and local structures that are gradually 484 
facilitating their disappearance.  In Spain artisanal fishermen have been empowered in  a local 485 
decision-making frameworks and by the adoption of co-management agencies such as inshore 486 
fisheries groups  which uphold and protect  collective decision-making in the distribution of 487 
BFT quotas [45]. In Malta, in contrast, fishers have EHFRPHµSRZHUOHVVVSHFWDWRUV¶[53] with 488 
no hope of changing their situation within the BFT fishery.  489 
 490 
5) Conclusion 491 
In the past decade the artisanal BFT fishery in Malta has become intermeshed with the 492 
globalizing effects of policy-making and subject to the exogenous forces of the transnational 493 
BFT market. The evolving nature of the BFT sector illustrates a shift from what was once an 494 
artisanal fishery to what has become an agro-food industry of BFT ranching shaped by market 495 
forces in the name of economic efficiency. The introduction of the ITQs and fishing capacity 496 
restrictions, as conservation tools to protect BFT, have synergistically created new power 497 
relations that dispossessed most of the artisanal sector and orchestrated the expansion of the 498 




tuna ranching industry. Through a descriptive analysis of these systemic developments, this 499 
study presents a showcase of how capitalistic processes of privatisation lead to resource 500 
appropriation that trigger major social inequities, and as a consequence, indigenous people face 501 
µDIRUFHIXOH[SXOVLRQ¶IURPWKHUHVRXUFHVXSRQZKLFKWKH\GHSHQG[7].   502 
 503 
The policy changes that have facilitated the industrialization of the fishery were the beginning 504 
of the end for the artisanal fishermen, since consecutive BFT decision-making has been 505 
consistently focused on the principles of economic efficiency that have suffocated the 506 
regeneration of the artisanal sector. The rationalization of the sector has triggered a legitimacy 507 
crisis over BFT fishing rights, and implicitly forced most of the artisanal fishermen to diversify 508 
their fishing activity onto other unmanaged, possibly overexploited, fishing systems. 509 
Cumulatively, these processes are generating a deep socio-ecological crisis which would 510 
appear to be beneath the radar of the Maltese government. As a result, the prospects in fishing 511 
have become bleak at multiple levels, and artisanal fishers are gradually abandoning the 512 
commercial fishing sector for they sense that the tide has turned against them. 513 
 514 
 The artisanal sector is likely to keep diminishing if it does not get sufficient and imminent 515 
political attention. The duty to safeguard the needs of fishers through proper governance 516 
principles currently exists only as rhetoric in institutional texts such as Ministerial speeches 517 
and the Co-operative Act which stipulates that the µFR-operatives work for the sustainable 518 
GHYHORSPHQWRIWKHLUFRPPXQLWLHVWKURXJKSROLFLHVDSSURYHGE\WKHLUPHPEHUV¶[54]. Some of 519 
WKHILVKHU¶s representatives, who have been elected in power by the artisanal fishers themselves, 520 
have been subjugating the voice of the artisanal sector and suppressing their resilience. 521 
 522 
Simultaneously, the close-knit arrangements between the fishing elites and the government 523 
have abandoned the needs of the smaller fishermen since their priorities, which they claim are 524 
aligned to the sustainable recovery of the BFT species, lie in the expanding BFT ranching 525 
sector and not on the continuity of the artisanal fishing communities.  The transition into 526 
ranching has been highly welcomed and incentivised by the national government and although 527 
WKLVWUDQVLWLRQLVODXGHGDVDWRRORIµGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ¶IRUILVKHUVLQUHDOLW\LWLVDSROLF\WKDWLV528 
VHUYLQJWKHHOLWLVWV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\REOLWHUDWLQJWKHDUWisanal sector. 529 
 530 
Finally, this study recommends that fisheries management needs to be re-examined by 531 
recognising and adopting the social and cultural pillars of sustainable development as well as 532 




the environmental and economic pillars.  The current top-down protection of resources is too 533 
reductionist and narrowly set on capitalistic rationality, and is likely to create socio-ecological 534 
misfits that will in turn create problems of a wider nature.  One obvious and tangible measure 535 
would be to allocate ITQs more equitably to allow the artisanal sector to regain a more healthy 536 
position and limit the transferability of the ITQs to avoid the concentration of rights into the 537 
hands of the powerful few.   538 
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